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A maxim is a subjective principle or a principle of which the subject acts. For any conscious action we have a maxim i.e., a subjective principle. A maxim is only a personal 'rule of life' or a 'general policy' of action. It is said to be subjective in the sense that it is being appropriated by the individual as his or her own, which need not necessarily be accepted by everybody else as a general policy of action. That means it has no universal application. It is the maxim that gives direction to the conscious action of an individual. Maxim can originate both from inclination and rationality. In that respect, maxims can be divided into (1) prudential maxim and (2) moral maxim. Prudential maxim represents an action as a means to an effect. For e.g., if you want to be popular don't hurt others. On the other hand moral maxim represents an action good in itself without reference to any further end. It is the universalizable maxim. Prudential maxims are conditional. It is related to an end. It has origin in inclinations. So it has a material role. That's why it is called prudential maxim. But moral maxims are free from all conditions. Unlike prudential maxims it is not affected by inclinations. It is also free from all conditions. Moral maxim necessitates the will universally. Kant writes, "all maxims have (1) a form which consist of universality, and regarding it the formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus; that maxims must be chosen as if they were to hold as universal law of nature; (2) a matter, i.e., an end, and regarding it the formula says; the rational being, as by its very nature an end and thus as an end-in-itself, must serve in every maxim as a limiting condition of all merely relative and arbitrary ends." Although maxims are subjective in nature and are the principles of action, have their origin in 'wille', which legislate rules by itself. Thus we are morally entitled to adopt all and only those maxims that we can regard ourselves as legislating for rational beings, whereby we can be basically autonomous and give law to ourselves. That means we should chose those maxims, which would represent a possible action good in itself without reference to any further end i.e., moral maxims.
DHARMARAM VIDYA KSHETRAM Pontifical Athenaeum of Philosophy, Theology and Canon Law
FREEDOM AND MORAL LAW
Lonesh Mathew (Reg. No. M10402)
Director Dr. Saju Chackalackal
An Assignment on Kantian Ethics
Bangalore, December 2010.
FREEDOM AND MORAL LAW
INTRODUCTION Kant’s moral theory is integrally related to the understanding of freedom. Understanding of one without the other is incomplete and untenable. Freedom is important because, on Kant's view, moral appraisal presupposes that we are free in the sense that we have the ability to do otherwise. Why? Consider Kant's example of a man who commits a theft. Kant holds that in order for this man’s action to be morally wrong, it must have been within his control in the sense that it was within his power at the time not to have committed a theft. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not.
In Critical Ethics freedom either as an idea or a fact, or a postulate, is the central notion in the writings of Kant. The First Critique points at the possibility or conceivability of freedom as a spontaneity. Kant’s Practical Philosophy is an attempt to feature freedom in terms of autonomy (self legislation). The first critique establishes the possibility of transcendental freedom while the second critique establishes its reality by showing its necessary connection with the moral law. The freedom of pure reason includes the freedom of practical reason as well as of theoretical reason.
The question now we can ask is ‘Are we free?’ For Kant we are free only with regard to moral law. We are free with regard to practical reason. We are not free with regard to theoretical reason because not given to us in sensible experience.
PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA It is necessary to distinguish between ‘Phenomena’ and ‘Noumena’. Phenomenal is what speculatively known. Here everything is causally determined and causal spontaneity is unthinkable. Here knowledge remains in appearance. Noumena means thing ‘in itself’. It is the world of things in themselves outside nature, outside space and time. We can practically know noumena not theoretically.
At Phenomenal level we are not free because we are bound by causality. At noumenal level we are free because here we spontaneously originate causality/ causal series. In the Phenomenal world we are restricted by laws of nature. In the noumenal world we have laws of self legislation and it is grounded in reason because human beings are naturally endowed with rationality. The realm of Phenomena is the empirical world and the realm of noumena is intelligible world.
RECIPROCITY The basis of Kant's moral law is ‘reciprocal’. The reciprocity is a mutual entailment between the following propositions; 1. The rational will is free 2. The moral law is unconditionally valid for the rational will This reciprocity is emphasized in the ‘Critique of Practical Reason”. In the ‘Groundwork’, the emphasis on the inference from freedom of will as a presupposition of the practical standpoint to the validity of the moral law. In the ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ Kant holds that moral law needs no “deduction” of any kind, but must be accepted as a self-evident fact of reason. The rational will is free is considered to be the indispensible presupposition of all rational judgment.
TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM AND PRACTICAL FREEDOM
Kant distinguishes between transcendental freedom and practical freedom. Transcendental freedom is the capacity of a cause to produce a state spontaneously or ‘from itself’. Kant also contends that freedom, so constructed, is a pure transcendental idea, neither derivable from nor referable to any object that can be given in experience. A transcendentally free cause, in other words, is a first cause, one that can be effective independently of any prior cause. Practical freedom is that which we attribute to ourselves as agents. Kant’s metaphysical contention is that the will can be practically free only if it is transcendentally free. The Transcendental freedom could exist only in a Noumenal world, not in the empirical world.
Practical freedom is in turn taken into two distinct senses. In the negative sense, a will is practically free if it acts independently of external causes determining how it acts. In the positive sense, it is practically free if it has the power to determine itself in accordance with its own law (G 4.446). The key to understand the ‘reciprocity’ is Kant’s conception of freedom as a special kind of causality. From this Kant infers that it must operate according to a law. In the case of a free cause the law must be ‘of a special kind’ (G4.446). A natural cause is a state of a substance upon which another state of some substance follows in accordance with a necessary rule; this rule is the pertinent causal law. Since a will acts not only according to the laws but according to their representation (G4.412), the ‘law’ of a free cause must be one it represents itself.
In the case of an imperfectly rational will, which doesn't always act as reason directs, the law is represented as a principle according to which it ought to act. We could describe such law, in contrast to a natural law, as an imperative, or a normative law. We often explain human actions by reference to norms the agent recognizes. E.g., a chess player moves the bishop only diagonally because that is the rule in chess. In constructing the sentences we speak or write, we choose words that accord with the rules of grammar, and we use these rules to explain why sentences are formed as they are.
Explanations of actions according to the agent’s intentions are normative law explanations. Intentions are constituted by the normative principles the agent adopts in forming the intention. We might think that normative law explanations could make no sense, depending on what ‘ought’ to happen rather than what does happen. But these normative law explanations are highly appropriate to voluntary, rational actions because rational actions are by their very concept freely chosen and norm guided. We should be careful to distinguish between Kant’s theories of freedom. Kant doesn't mean to say that the moral law stands in the same relation to actions as a natural causal law to its effects.
FREEDOM AS A NECESSARY PRESUPPOSITION In the ‘Groundwork’ Kant adopts a position according to which to act as if we are free is equal to be free. In Groundwork Kant considers freedom as a presupposition; a necessary presupposition; a transcendental principle. Kant arrives at the possibility of morality adopting freedom as a presupposition. Presupposing freedom becomes a regulative idea necessary for morality. In ‘Lectures on Ethics’ he states that “the freedom of the human being must be presupposed if it is to be an end in itself. So such being must therefore have freedom of the will. I don't know how I comprehend it; yet it is a necessary hypothesis if I am thinking of rational beings as ends-in-themselves.
Though Reason cannot prove that freedom is a fact of objective reality, the common experience of a moral agent willing is taken to be an exercise of the free will. Kant doesn't think that the freedom of the will can be theoretically demonstrated. In the CPrR, Kant argues that the idea of a free will is a transcendent idea to which no experience can ever be adequate. Two conclusions can be drawn; 1. That freedom cannot be attributed to the will as an object of experience. 2. That it can never be shown that the will is not free, if it is considered as a noumenon or thing in itself.
What is common to both the groundwork and the critique of practical reason is the claim that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts.In the Groundwork Kant claims that “freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings” (G4:447). Freedom is not proved theoretically, but it is claimed to be a presupposition.
“Now one cannot possible think of a reason that would consciously receive direction from another quarter with respect to its judgments, since the subject would then attribute the determination of his judgment not to reason but to an impulse. Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must be regarded of itself as free”. (G 4:448) The assurance of freedom that we can have derives from our own consciousness of duty which according to Kant is apriori in origin and inconceivable if we were not free already to some extent. A moral agent is said to fulfil his duty implies that he or she is conscious of freedom. That means moral agent must admit that it is possible for him to do what ought to be done and hence he is conscious of freedom.
FREEDOM A TRANSCENDENTAL CONDITION The freedom that Kant introduces in the second critique is not ‘practical translation of a natural law’, but transcendental freedom. No determing ground of the will except the universal legislative form can serve as a law for it, such will must be conceived as wholly independent of the natural law of appearences in their mutual relations, i.e., the law of causality. Such independence is called freedom in the strictest sense, i.e., trannscendental ssense. Therfore, a will to which only the legislative form of the maxim can serve as a law is a free will (CPrR Ak.V,29(Beck 28).
This transcendental freedom is involved in the autonomous legislation of moral law. Hence, it is not a postulate but a fact of reason. It is this transcendental freedom as directed to moral disposition and action in the world and to the promotion of the highest and complete good. However, freedom as a fact of reason, as content of our consciousness, is the basis of the moral agent’s attempts to translate the moral law into his own maxim.
Kant's conception of freedom has two distinct aspects. The First Critique introduces the concept of freedom as spontaneity (that faculty which initiates a new causal series in time, unconstrained by any alien forces). In the Groundwork and other ethical works Kant brings out the concept of freedom as autonomy (the capacity of self legislation and independence from any pre-given law). These may be distinguished as a freedom from any form of dependency, and a freedom to legislate for oneself. They stand for a negative and a positive understanding of freedom. In the negative freedom, “the will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational”. Here a will is practically free if it acts independently of external causes determining how it acts. Negative freedom is, then, the power to restrain and overcome inclination by reason. This is possible through our will which exercises freedom of choice to bring about our independence from sensuous impulse in our rational determination.
In the positive sense “the will is in all its actions a law to itself’ expresses. Here freedom is the power of causal determination ensuing from our own reason that enables us to judge and act autonomously. It is moral law which leads us directly to the concept of freedom. The assurance of freedom that we can have derives from our own consciousness of duty. Duty according to Kant is apriori in origin and inconceivable. It is a transcendental condition. The fact is that a moral agent is said to be fulfil his duty implies that he or she is conscious of freedom
To have freedom and to exercise it in acting morally is to be responsible moral agent, whose actions are not merely free actions but which acts as a free agent under moral law. A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same. The will itself is the source of moral laws, is the faculty of autonomous self legislation that is pure reason in its ability to be practical. Freedom is thus the inner value of the world. Autonomy and self legislation are complementary dimensions at the basis of human freedom.
TWO SENSES OF FREEDOM 1. Freedom of Spontaneity 2. Freedom as Autonomy Freedom as spontaneity is the negative understanding of freedom. Freedom as autonomy is the positive understanding of freedom. Freedom as spontaneity is in the First Critique. This refers to unconditioned by alien forces. This is “freedom from”. It is negative in the sense that it has the power to restrain and overcome inclination by the exercise of rationality, independence from whatever is empirical. In Positive sense it means that the exercise of our own rationality to bring about a moral maxim that we give unto ourselves; a new power of causal determination which originate from our own reason. This power enables us to judge and to act autonomously.
KANT’S NATURALISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF FREEDOM There is a possibility of combining Kant’s ethical theory with a naturalistic picture of human beings. In Kant's historical and anthropological writings there is an attempt t integrate human freedom to a naturalistic understanding of human being as a biological species. A few statements in his writings indicate Kant’s conception of natural or empirical study of human nature and conduct (anthropology). All actions of human beings in the domain of appearence are determined in conformity with the order of nature,... and if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearences of the wills of human beings, ther would not be found a single human action we couldnot predict with certainity and recodnize as proceeding necessarily from antecedent conditions. So far, then... there is no freedom. (KrV A550/B578)
Kant never pretends to seek empirical proofs of human freedom. His anthropology proceeds on the fundamental presupposition that human beings are free.
CONCLUSION We think of ourselves in two different ways; we are free and we are physical beings. Now the Problem is physical beings are causally determined and all their actions are caused by earlier events. When we think of ourselves as physical beings we are NOT thinking of ourselves as free beings. Our ‘inclinations’ (desires and emotions) are part of our physical existence. So these are not part of our freedom. When we think of ourselves as free, we think of ourselves as rational beings. To be free is to guided by reason Not by inclination. Acting morally is acting freely. How do we work out what the moral law is? The answer is Use the Categorical Imperative.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Intrapretation and Defense. London: Yale Univeristy Press, 1983.
Chackalackal, Saju. Unity of Knowing and Acting in Kant: A Paradigmatic Integration of the Theoretical and the Practical. Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2002.
Thuniampral, Shibin. Through Freedom to the Real: A Study on the Basis of a Triadic Unity of Freedom, Action and God in Kantian Ethics. Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2007.
Wood, Allen W. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Canbridge University Press, 1999.
1. INTRODUCTION Kant’s project in the Groundwork is “the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality” The establishment of moral principles and moral laws culminated in formulations of the categorical imperative which is the form of all properly moral principles. This categorical imperative arise from reason. It is the universal and supreme principle of morality which admits of no conditions or exceptions because there is nothing higher by reference to which conditions or exceptions could be justified. For Kant there is a single moral obligation, which he called the "categorical imperative", and it is derived from the concept of duty. Duty comes in as the practice of this categorical imperative. In fact, in Kant’s theory, the fundamental moral law is the categorical imperative and remains the ground of ethical duties. For Kant, duty is a necessity to act from an obligation. And that necessity needs to be objective and universal in order to have moral value and has no need to refer to any Supreme Being except autonomy and good will grounded on pure reason. Kant writes : “ A will whose maxims necessarily accord with the laws of autonomy is a holy, or absolute good, will. The dependence of the will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (that is, moral necessitation) is obligation. Obligation can thus have no reference to a holy being. The objective necessity to act from obligation is called duty.” For Kant, an action fulfilling an ethical duty has greater moral merit if it is performed from duty, but the incentive from which we perform a right action makes no difference to its juridical rightness. Under human conditions, where we have to struggle against unruly impulses, inclinations and desires, a good will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty. In this paper, I will study this concept of duty in Kantian ethics, its motives, its meanings, its grounds in link with his philosophical thought in general. I will demonstrate the originality of the concept “duty” and show that Kant “provided a very different account of ordinary moral reasoning,” for the performance of juridical duties may be externally coerced, but Kant’s basic conception of ethical or moral duty is inner or self-constraint. Duties are ends in themselves. These ends based on the categorical imperative, are exceedingly important to the structure of Kantian morality. For Kant, all ethical duties are grounded on ends that is why his theory of ethical duties is entirely teleological. 2. KANTIAN’S CONCEPT OF DUTY Why is duty is an odious word? Asked one of Kantian scholars Allen wood. According to him, “ ‘Duty’ is not only a crucial concept in Kant’s ethics but also in effect a technical term in Kantian vocabulary.” Whatever affinity the Kantian sense of ‘duty’ may have with the ordinary meaning of the word in English (or of Pflicht in German), must depend on our putting some distance between the technical Kantian meaning of his word “duty” and the sense of the term as it is used commonly. In general understanding, “duty is what a person is obligated or required to do. Duties can be moral, legal, parental, occupational, professional, etc., all depending on their foundations or grounds. Because a duty can have several grounds, it can be, say, both moral and legal, though it need not be of more than one type.” In this sense, duties are often what we have in consequence of some role we play in a social institution, arrangement, or relationship. The danger of this common understanding of duty is that people therefore appeal to duty when they want to put an end to critical reflection about what we are doing. Soldiers are supposed to think of their duty to their unit, to their commanders, to their “mission”, to their country, to their flag and nothing else. This understanding of duty makes them fearless and killing machines without guilt consciousness. Kantian theory and understanding of “duty” will give answer to such dilemma and show that it is a new technical concept. For Kant, duty has a strong link with good will. In his explanations, “duty” refers to the act of freely making oneself to desire something and do it because he appreciates moral reasons there are for doing it. Therefore, “to do something from duty means: to obey reason.” Obedience here signifies neither external authority nor coercion but only that the reasons are moral reasons, as distinct from merely instrumental or prudential reasons. Acting from duty do not obey any law except one of good will or self-constraint to respect moral law. “Kant gives the name “duty” to all actions we have moral reasons to do, even meritorious actions that are not morally blamable to omit, because (human nature being what it is), we will occasionally need to exercise inner rational constraint if we are to perform these morally valuable actions.”
3. THE MOTIVES OF DUTY A human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination, or from self-interest, but because it is done for the sake of duty. Thus the motive of duty includes all the properly moral reasons we have to perform morally valuable actions. Kant distinguishes two essentials elements that can motivate our actions. As far as the realizations of our duties are concerned, Kant suggest that we should act from duty (aus Pflicht) instead of acting for the sake of duty (Pflichtmässig). 3.1. Acting from Duty: Perfect Duties In the beginning of the second section of Groundwork, Kant says that the only thing in this world or outside of it that is good without limitations is the good will. He stipulates that acting from duty is a supreme value of morality and the only motive of moral law because it has his source from reason or self-legislation: “Thus morality lies in the relation of our actions to the autonomy of the will−that is to a possible making of universal law by means of its maxims. An action which is compatible with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one which does not harmonize with it is forbidden.” What does Kant mean by “acting from duty”? I said above already that the concept “duty” it self is technical, confusing and perilous enough. We saw that “duty is the necessity of an action from the respect for the law” and that the term “law” refers to any practical principle of reason that is objectively and universally valid for all rational beings and it has to be necessary. This necessity refers to what Kant calls “Practical necessitation” and means what is constraint. This constraint or obligation does not refer to external constraint or coercion, as by chains, prison, prison walls, or threats, but rather the inner rational self-constraint that one exercises over oneself from respect for correct principles. As Allen Wood would summarize it, “To act from duty, in short, is to do something because you know that an objectively valid moral principle demands it, so that gives you a good reason for deciding to do it, and then making yourself do it.” As we know, Kant is never interested in the difference between good and bad actions, or between actions worthy of moral and actions unworthy of it. He is much more interested in the intentionality of the moral agent. Self-esteem, honor, good reputation, sympathy or compassion can never be, by themselves source of moral worth. His concern is “what is a authentic, genuine moral worth?” The answer is that any action has moral worth when the moral agent acts from duty only. Kant insists that duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law. Therefore, Perfect Duties do not allow the leeway in the interest of inclination. They don’t permit one to choose among several possible ways of fulfilling them. Thus, the duty to help those in need is an imperfect duty since it can be fulfilled by helping the sick, the starving, the oppressed, etc. But if one chooses to help the sick, one can choose which of the sick to help. However, the duty to keep one’s promises and the duty not to harm others are perfect duties since they do not allow one to choose which promises to keep or which people not to harm.
3.2. Acting for the Sake of Duty : Imperfect Duties For Kant, the first problem of legal duties is conformism. It is necessary to do one’s duty from the motive of duty. “For if any action is to be morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law, it must also be done for the sake of the moral law: where there is not so, the conformity is only too contingent and precarious, since the non-moral ground at work will now and then produce actions which is in accord with the law, but very often which transgress it.” To act for the sake of duty lack moral worth and therefore has some insufficiency. As Kant himself suggested, it is very important to make a difference between to act from duty and to act for the sake of duty. Not all actions that are “in conformity with duty” (Pflichtmässig) are “from duty” (aus Plicht). This has to be well understood. According to Kant, some dutiful good actions, though possible occasions for self-constraint, do not need to be done with self-constraint, because they agree with some of our immediate inclination, empirical desire, or instinct. For such actions, there is no claim of morality worth because reason, self-constraint and good will are not fully involved in decision making and doing . In other words, we can or should act from duty only and no self-interest reason or empirical inclination is sufficient to motivate us to perform an action. Acting from duty is a pull against our empirical inclinations. Therefore, only few human actions can belong to the class of moral actions because in order to be logically valid they must be based on pure reason ; and in order to be good, an action must only be performed for the sake of a moral law and not for some other purpose. I like Kant philosophy because of the rigorism of his moral principles and we can see that there is no room for compromise. Like categorical imperative, duties are principles that are intrinsically valid; they are good ends in themselves, they must be obeyed in all, and by all situations and circumstances. Whenever there is no good will, no self-legislation, no autonomy, therefore no moral worth. It is conformism which create imperfect duties. Imperfect duties are, in Kant’s words, “duties which allow leeway in the interest of inclination,” and “permit one to choose among several possible ways of fulfilling them.” 4. DUTIES OF VIRTUE In Kant philosophy, ethical duties are duties of virtue. His ethics are merely “the Doctrine of Virtue” and ethical virtues are “the obligatory ends of pure practical reason”. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant describes “virtue” as a naturally acquired faculty of a non-holy will or “the moral disposition in the struggle. Virtue is characterized by “moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty. In fact Kant believes that all ends are duties but not virtues. Imperfect or wide duties should guide us in setting the ends of life: my own perfection and happiness of others. This section will be interesting in the sense that we are going to see when and how our own duties and ends must combine at the same time one’s happiness and perfections of others in order to be morally good. Human beings have the duty to act from duty. 4.1. Duties to Oneself. In the Western but mainly Anglophone tradition of moral philosophy, the concept of duty to oneself is commonly applied to alleged duties to promote one’s welfare. For Kant, the rational claims of our own happiness rest on prudential reason, not moral reason. Because our own happiness is something we inevitably pursue from prudence without the constraint of duty. Thus, in Kantian Ethics, the concept of a duty to oneself has nothing to do with self interest, self-love, honour, egocentrism or any duty to promote one’s happiness. “My duty towards myself cannot be treated juridically; The law touches only our relations with other men; I have no legal obligations towards myself; and whatever I do to myself I do to a consenting party; I cannot not commit an act of injustice against myself.” For Kant, human freedom limits moral agent to any thing which is not rational. Therefore, everything would depend on how and individual determined his own happiness; for our self-regarding duties would consist in the universal rule to satisfy all our inclinations in order to further our happiness. This would, however, militate seriously against doing our duties towards others. “in fact, the principle of self-regarding duties is a very different one, which has no connection with our well-being or earthly happiness. Far from ranking lowest in the scale of precedence, our duties towards ourselves are of primary importance and should have pride of place; for (…) it is obvious that nothing can be expected from a man who dishonours his own person.” Consequently, according to Kant, “The most serious offence against the duty one owes to oneself is suicide.”. For Kant suicide is abominable not because it is forbidden by God or by any religious or civil law. “Suicide is an abomination because it implies the abuse of man’s freedom of action: He uses freedom to destroy himself. His freedom should be employed to enable him to live as a man.” Duties to ourselves as moral beings in effect are duties regarding our humanity and our rational capacity to set ends and treat ourselves as ends. And if I can take the example of suicide, a man who commits such crime does not use humanity as end but as a means to fulfill his irrational happiness. Thus, it goes against the principle of autonomy, freedom, and self-legislation. 4.2. Duties towards Others. For Kant duties towards others are divided into duties of love and duties of respect. This distinction is in accordance with the feeling that accompany their performance, but the content of these duties is to conduct ourselves in a certain ways, not a duty to feel anything. 4. 2. 1. Duties of Love. According to Kant, duties of love are duties to benefit others (MS 6:450), while duties of respect are duties to avoid humiliating them and enabling them to maintain their self-respect (MS 6:449). Kant further divides the duties of love into duties of beneficence, gratitude and sympathetic participation (Teilnehmung). According to him, we have the duty to place the happiness of others among our ends, and the wide duty to return benefits to those who have benefited us. Kant thinks that the duty of sympathetic participation is important and above duty of beneficence and gratitude. For this reason he names it “humanity” (Humanität, humanitas practica). It is important because humanity includes the duty to cultivate the feeling of sympathy in order to strengthen our sensibility to the needs of others and strengthen our capacity to perform duties of beneficence. According to Wood, “The duty of ‘sympathetic participation’ deserves special mention, because the conception itself is perhaps not an obvious one and because appreciating its role in Kantian ethics will help to correct important elements in prevailing false image of Kantian ethics.” Concluding this topic, Kant says that participation, along with love, is also something we all need from other human beings. 4.2.2. Duties of Respect For Kant, respecting others requires us to moderate our own self-esteem to allow for proper recognition of the dignity of others. Kant include under the duty not to ‘give scandal’ or to tempt other into the acts for which they will later have reason to reproach themselves. Kantian ethics recognizes only that respect which is grounded in human dignity ( a value that cannot be surpassed or added to), and therefore, it appraises all human beings as of equal absolute worth. From this logic, true merits are shameful and vicious. “Kantian ethics holds that where morality is concerned, we should compare ourselves with the moral law or the idea of virtue, but never with others (VE 27:349, 462, MS 6:435-436). Human achievements have value, but they give the achiever no higher self-worth.” Duties of respect follow the basic principle that all human beings are equal in dignity as ends in themselves. 5. CONCLUSION Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals develops the logical foundation for a moral philosophy which is based on a priori rather than empirical principles. Kant’s concern to provide a theory of pure practical reason for moral philosophy is thereby to establish a supreme principle of morality which have universal validity. The moral worth of an act derives from the principle on which the action is performed. The concept of “duty” is the centre of Kantian Ethics. Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence to the law. Kant made a difference between acting from duty and acting for the sake of duty . We saw that only in the second one there is moral worth because it is the motive or the intentionality of an action that determines its moral value. As Dr Chackalackal concludes on Kant’s duty: “Hence the absolute law of reason for Kant is duty itself. The injunction of the Metaphysic of Morals is clear: “Do your duty from the motive of duty.” We must do our duty for the sake of duty because Reason commands us to do it. It is a self-constraint act whose motive is the duty itself. The nature of moral duty and the good will are inseparable and closely related. In order to be moral, any moral agent has to act from duty itself or it is our duty to act from duty with the good will. It would not be a duty to pursue a certain effect of our will, if it were not possible to do so. Kant’s “ought” implies “can”. The motive of an action is more important than the consequences of the action, that is why the moral value of an action should only be judged by the motives of the action and not by the consequences of the action. The principles of ethical duties go beyond the merely formal principle of duty and they have to do with the matter of choice, namely with ends. Kantian ethics is a system of ends whereby humanity is an absolute end in himself. The foundations of Kantian theory of ethical duties are teleological, and they have to promote certain obligatory ends like perfection or happiness. Therefore, there can be no reliable fulfillment of duty without some degree of virtue because human nature is such that virtue is the fundamental presupposition of all reliable conduct. Kant willingly ignored the human nature to act out of inclinations, desires or feelings. That is why he was criticized of being idealist. As conclusion, I think that Kant is a rational idealistic moral philosopher who believed in virtue, in the human power of self-legislation, in freedom, in the good will of a being capable of doing duty for the sake of duty itself: “The ultimate destiny of the human race is the greatest moral perfection, provided that it is achieved through human freedom, whereby alone man is capable of the greatest happiness.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Chackalachal, Saju. Unity of Knowing and Acting: A Paradigmatic Integration of the Theoretical and the Practical. Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 2002.
Guyer, Paul. Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. London: Continuum, 2007. Kant , Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1965. Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. T.K. Abboti. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1988.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton. New York: Harper Torchbooks and Row, 1964.
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics. New York: Happer Torchbook and Row, 1963.
Reath, Andrews. Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition, s. v. “Duty,” by Robert Audi, 248-249.
Wood, W. Allen. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Wood, W. Allen. Kant. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
Wood, W. Allen. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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